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‘War is the Continuation of 
Economics by Other Means’
Ghazni Province may be the richest prov-
ince in Afghanistan. It contains four official 
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) 
tenders, in addition to significant amounts 
of other marketable resources, such as chro-
mite, gold, and land. The United States Geo-
logical Survey (USGS) assessments indicate 
that the corridor along Highway 1, between 
Kabul and Kandahar, may be one of the 
richest mineral regions in the world. Brine 
lakes in Nawer and Nawa districts of Ghazni 
Province are thought to contain some of the 
world’s largest known lithium deposits. Gold 
and copper deposits in the Zarkashan area of 
Ghazni are valued at approximately US$30 
billion; not including the Katawas Gold Area 
in Andar District. Together with other newly 
discovered deposits countrywide, Afghani-
stan’s mineral wealth is estimated between 
US$1–3 trillion, with Ghazni holding a large 
percentage of that wealth (Risen 2010; Lefty 
2012; Najafizada 2011).
Since 2005, the USGS Mineral Resources 
Project has worked with scientists from 
Afghanistan Geologic Survey to develop 
open source analysis of Afghanistan’s non-
fuel resources. Their work culminated in an 
unprecedented wealth of detailed reporting 
consisting of area summaries, hyperspectral 
mapping analysis, geohydrologic summaries, 
and information packages in a readily availa-
ble and accessible format. It is unclear to what 
extent this information has been circulated 
inside Afghanistan. However, general knowl-
edge of the location and value of mineral 
resources has been highly publicized in inter-
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Security and governance in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan are threatened by resource con-
flict dynamics: groups focus on exploiting lootable resources in the short term while weak 
institutions and conflict persist. Elements within the Afghan government and insurgent 
organizations alike expand their power and influence in this manner. Understanding how 
criminal organizations operate within the regional political economy is essential to reduc-
ing the leverage these networks, associated criminal syndicates, and corrupt government 
officials have on the community. We proffer three hypotheses for development and stability 
practitioners to monitor as transition approaches in 2014, as well as recommendations for 
mitigating the onset of resource conflict in Ghazni as the province experiences a downgrade 
in foreign security forces. Adopting effective, anti-insurgency policies will be fundamental 
to mitigating the malicious effects on the population and providing incentives for peace, 
rather than continuing conflict.
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national media since the release of the USGS 
reports. While these studies draw attention to 
the fact that resources have been exploited 
throughout the civil war and the Taliban era 
for individual and insurgent profits, they 
have also contributed to the predatory behav-
ior exhibited by regional power brokers and 
political institutions. Institutional arrange-
ments and clientele networks linked to the 
resource sector may shape the political envi-
ronment through the creation of a repres-
sive security apparatus and by rewarding a 
close circle of supporters (Le Billon 2001). 
For example, Anyak–the first mine tenured 
in November 2009–was granted to China 
Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) after 
then Minister of Mines Ibrahim Adel received 
a US$30 million bribe. On another occasion, 
Mahmoud Karzai (the President’s brother) 
and a small group of Ghori Cement investors 
‘won’ the rights to all cement in Afghanistan 
for 30 years (NYT 2009: 2012). The primacy 
of informal relationships presents myriad 
opportunities for corruption and danger-
ously unregulated competition.
Ghazni’s security industry does not hold 
the promise of its mining industry. While 
Highway One splits the province in half 
and serves as a halfway point between the 
growing metropolises of Kabul and Kanda-
har, it remains a volatile zone with highway 
bandits, charred convoys, and craters from 
insurgent improvised explosive devices. 
While improvements have been made and 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
are becoming increasingly self capable and 
sufficient, there are still significant gaps in 
security throughout the province, namely 
the limited spread and influence of ANSF, 
particularly outside of urban areas. 
In this article, we assess the conflict in 
Ghazni through the lens of political economy, 
focusing on the greed over grievance argu-
ment as potentially creating the conditions 
for greater levels of conflict as foreign secu-
rity forces complete their withdrawal. First, 
we assess the theoretical basis for resource 
conflicts and how these conflicts influence 
organizational behaviors. Second, we address 
Ghazni’s resource conflict issues more specif-
ically with regards to illicit seizure and trade 
of lootable resources. Finally, we develop rec-
ommendations for mitigating increased risk 
of resource conflict in Ghazni. This study is 
based on reflections of our combined expe-
rience of over two years in Ghazni Province 
conducting interviews with Afghan local 
nationals and government officials as embed-
ded researchers with US and NATO forces. In 
addition, our argument and analysis is sup-
ported by secondary, open-source research.1
Understanding the role of natural 
resources in the Ghazni Province conflict 
may allow stability and foreign policy prac-
titioners to better negotiate a sustainable 
end to regional violence and corruption. In 
many conflicts it is common to find that par-
ticipants are inspired by more than ideology; 
countless stakeholders benefit from violence 
and have an economic interest in certain 
outcomes or the continuation of conflict. 
Approaching the conflict from a political 
economy perspective can mitigate the poten-
tial rise in violence and facilitate a sustain-
able resolution of conflict.
‘Peacemaking requires not only political 
negotiations, but transforming the war econ-
omy into a peace economy and creating insti-
tutions for accountability over economic and 
political decision making’ (Rubin 2000).
The War Economy in Afghanistan
‘War is the continuation of politics by other 
means.’ This renowned statement by Carl 
von Clausewitz in the early 19th century has 
been rephrased by 21st century scholars: ‘War 
is the continuation of economics by other 
means’ (Kaldor 1999). Instability and vio-
lence often provide economic incentives to 
individuals and groups to perpetuate con-
flict. Examples of such resource conflicts 
abound, from conflict diamonds in Sierra 
Leone, to oil extraction in Indonesia, to for-
estry depletion in the Philippines. Research 
has shown that certain types of resources 
such as minerals, gemstones, and narcotics 
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tend to prolong or expand the geographi-
cal scope of pre-existing conflicts (Fearon 
2004; Buhaug & Gates 2002). In conflict 
zones where opportunity to extract new 
resources exists, entrepreneurs may direct 
violent actors to control these rich areas in 
order to secure alternative profit-generating 
mechanisms or run shadow state economies 
(Reno 1998; 2000). Studies have shown that 
rebel groups tend to be more violent when 
they operate in environments rich with natu-
ral resources or with resource endowments 
derived from outside funders, whereas those 
groups which emerge in limited resourced 
areas tend to use violence more ‘selectively 
and strategically’ based on the need to main-
tain social capital (Reno 2010). Hence, the 
nature of economic endowments an area 
holds can shape the structure and character 
of violent organizations as well as the con-
flict itself. 
During thirty years of civil war, Afghani-
stan developed a substantial war economy 
that continues today. Supply routes estab-
lished during the anti-Soviet resistance, 
which supplied weapons and humanitarian 
aid, ‘laid the foundations for the regional-
ized war economy’ that was to emerge in 
the 1990s (Goodhand 2005). The Afghan 
economy was informal and decentralized. 
When the Taliban came to power in 1996, 
they did not have the capacity to manage the 
Afghan economy, although they technically 
controlled most of Afghanistan. They gov-
erned each region through administrative 
proxy, namely by use of local authorities that 
allowed the extraction of payments by local 
commanders and predatory economic activi-
ties. These economic activities and networks 
became entrenched over thirty years of civil 
war and remain intact in much of Afghani-
stan today. While the wars in Afghanistan 
were fought over a variety of local, national, 
and international issues, there is little evi-
dence to suggest that resource acquisition 
served as a primary cause of these conflicts. 
And, while most rebels and government rep-
resentatives will recite years of inter-tribal or 
ethnic grievances, few will mention personal 
wealth accumulated in the wars that ensued. 
However, these networks and informal sup-
ply chains served the interests of the pow-
erful in a war economy and in many cases 
expanded the conflict to new levels. 
Regional strong men, former mujahe-
deen commanders, and Taliban continue to 
take advantage of established commercial 
networks, while working within the newly 
established political system (Giustozzi 2003; 
2009). They exploit cross-border trading 
networks, regional ethnic groups, and legal 
commercial entities, each of which may 
have a vested interest in the continuation 
of conflict and instability. These individuals 
make rational, cost-benefit analysis decisions 
intended to maximize not only efficiency 
and resources, but also their social capital 
within society. While rewards are often mate-
rial in nature, in Afghanistan, non-material 
incentives such as prestige, acceptance, and 
the ability to exercise power and influence 
in one’s community hold significant leverage 
over a strongman’s decision-making process 
(Polyani 1958; Wood 2004; Weinstein 2007). 
The interests of regional strongmen often 
conflict with the institutional drive of the 
Afghan government and its international 
partners, such as the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), which advocates for-
mal and fair market institutions 
All wars evolve uniquely, as many include 
multiple conflict zones that vary signifi-
cantly in terms of geography, demography, 
or institutional structures; this is particularly 
true of Afghanistan. Each region supports its 
own networks, social groups, and economic 
incentives, which require micro-level inves-
tigation to understand how they function 
within their community. Beyond the scope 
of this article, a stakeholder analysis of each 
of these regional economies is necessary to 
understand how they come together within 
and beyond the borders of Afghanistan. In 
order to prevent or mitigate a war economy, 
it is important to understand what indi-
vidual, organizational, and societal motives 
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and incentives are for participating in it. Are 
groups seeking funds to fight for an ideal, 
amass personal wealth, or just trying to sur-
vive? What incentives do groups have to seek 
peace? Addressing these questions will help 
develop more targeted policies of conflict 
resolution and offer stakeholders a better 
understanding of the human and resource 
geography in Ghazni and the rest of Afghani-
stan. A separate study should address these 
questions, but first we assess the political 
economy of war in Ghazni. 
Focus & Method
We focus on conditions that may gener-
ate a resource conflict in Ghazni, utilizing 
three simple hypotheses as guidelines. The 
hypotheses focus on organizational behav-
ior in a changing environment, changes in 
resource architecture, and a weak land ten-
ure system. There are additional hypotheses 
that could have informed this study, but we 
have chosen these three as most practical, 
based on our tours in Afghanistan and the 
existing body of scholarly research 
Hypothesis 1: Organizations operating 
under conditions of resource scarcity will 
adapt their ideological and social patterns to 
fit emerging economic realities. If statutory 
structures do not allow for licit economic activ-
ity, groups will use illicit networks and build 
partnerships with criminal and insurgent 
organizations.
Hypothesis 2: If new resource opportuni-
ties develop in conflict areas, and regula-
tory institutions are too weak to address the 
change, then competition and conflict based 
on resource capture will increase.
Hypothesis 3: Structures of land ownership 
without local support will likely increase con-
flict and decrease the legitimacy of the provin-
cial and national government.
We address these hypotheses in the fol-
lowing sections as we discuss the nature 
of organizational behavior in resource rich 
areas, how state actors conspire with insur-
gent actors for resource exploitation, and the 
emergence of land mafia in conflict environ-
ments. While looking at Ghazni as a micro-
case, this study could have a broader com-
parative impact throughout Afghanistan, of 
which we draw inferences to particular cases. 
Organization and Motivation in 
Resource Conflict Areas
Organizations rely upon and fall under 
institutional constraints such as rational, 
sociological, and historical institutionalism. 
Rational institutions focus on efficiency 
maximization; sociological institutions con-
centrate on appropriate behaviors and social 
norms that guide action; and historical insti-
tutions address path dependent norms, rules, 
and precedents (Hall & Taylor 2008; Powell & 
Dimaggio 1991). Key to these three theoreti-
cal paths is that they are not mutually exclu-
sive but interdependent explanations to how 
organizations behave. As economic behavior 
is embedded in societal institutions, the val-
ues (whether real or not) of profit and risk are 
constructed in a culturally specific manner. 
Hence, organizations may be guided by the 
profit motive, but limited by socially accept-
able behaviors. By the same token, historical 
norms can explain past and future behavior, 
but also change or be changed by what is 
socially acceptable. Furthermore, changes in 
the social or economic environment (such as 
new mining tenures, land rushes, or exter-
nal oversight) may force organizations to 
adapt and evolve to new conditions. A good 
example of this is the evolving character of 
the MoMP in Afghanistan since 2009 from 
as one organization calls an ‘implementing 
owner-operator to a policy-making regula-
tor’ (Guardian 2013). This transition in the 
midst of violent conflict and an imminent 
gold rush to Afghanistan’s most viable 
resource market is an important one, but can 
it withstand pressures driven up from the 
local level to ensure extraction benefits soci-
ety more equitably? And who decides the 
nature of equitable distribution in a highly 
contested environment? 
The combination of western rule of law 
and economic standards with a tribal/
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religious insurgency in Afghanistan is one 
example of the forced adaptation organiza-
tions may need to undergo. While Afghan 
government and business leaders may oper-
ate with western partners and acknowledge 
western legal standards, they are also bound 
by traditional institutions at the village 
level–systems which regard patronage, cli-
entelism, and collective behavior as vital and 
routine (Roy 1987; Rubin 2002). Thus, while 
Kabul may implement formal, western-style 
standards, they may not actually be carried 
out. From one perspective, this, discrepancy 
ensures less fair and more corrupt practices 
take hold, enriching individual clients over 
communities, and potentially building a 
new era of ‘robber barons’ in Afghanistan. 
From another perspective, it ensures that 
resources are shared more equitably through 
the leadership of local service providers 
(Giustozzi 2009). Either way, without formal 
and objective oversight, it’s typical that clear 
winners and losers emerge in the equation as 
warlords and their patrons distribute to loy-
alists and punish enemies by shutting them 
out. If institutions are weak from above, 
the incentive to follow international norms 
and business practices may only be effective 
when they bubble up from below. We should 
also bear in mind that, if warlords are able 
to spread the benefits of the Afghan state 
more equitably than outside corporations 
and their western practices, then our label of 
‘warlord’ should be adjusted to ‘service pro-
viders’ (Giustozzi 2010). 
When international regulatory bodies are 
weak or fail to act, as they have in Afghani-
stan, we may view the existence of informal 
networks conducting business as rather 
efficient. Over the last thirty years, most 
processes of the extractive industry’s sup-
ply chain have been conducted without for-
mal oversight, taxation, or regulation by the 
Afghan state. While the status quo is small in 
scale compared to what U.S. and the Afghan 
MoMP anticipate could be a booming indus-
try, it operates illicitly and with benefit to 
networks both supportive of and opposed to 
the government. For example, local villagers 
with a chromite mine in vicinity will be part 
of an elaborate agreement between equip-
ment operators, truckers, policemen, govern-
ment officials, insurgents, and international 
terrorist organizations such as the Haqqani 
Network to drill, extract, protect, and trans-
port the resource through the supply chain 
to the international market place. Each part 
of the supply chain falls in line with social 
patterns and economic realities within local 
areas–a process the government has cho-
sen to outsource, given the complexity and 
historical realities of state. Formalizing the 
extractive industries requires upsetting the 
status quo, which we suspect is a significant 
reason for the slow transition. In addition, 
the effort to bring the estimated 1,800 ille-
gally operated mines under MoMP control 
will be a daunting task.2 
Lootable vs. Unlootable Resources 
in Conflict Areas
The classic definition of lootability is a natu-
ral resource that can be extracted and trans-
ported with ease by groups or individuals 
(Ross 2003). The importance of lootable 
resources to the perpetuation of conflict 
is that these resources serve as commodi-
ties that are highly amenable, can be taxed 
at one or more points in the supply chain, 
and allow for mobility (Le Billon 2001). We 
expand the definition of lootable resource 
to include land. While land is not extracted 
or transported, it is easily traded, gifted, and 
seized, making it amenable; it is treated as a 
valuable commodity in Afghanistan where 
one’s social standing is often judged based on 
land ownership; and it has the potential for 
taxation or rent – a thriving market in urban 
and rich agricultural areas of Afghanistan. In 
some cases, land is the most valuable lootable 
resource in Afghanistan, as it provides access 
to secondary lootable resources such as min-
eral sites, poppy fields, or lumber forests. 
Both state and non-state actors benefit (often 
mutually) from lootable natural resources; as 
such, it is necessary to consider each actor’s 
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role in the acquisition, protection, and expan-
sion of the lootable resource market. 
Lootable and unlootable resources have 
been used for insurgent and government 
enterprise throughout the long history of 
civil war. In addition, lootable resource con-
flicts often display some of the more brutal 
forms of predation on civilian populations 
(Azam & Hoeffler 2002). There is strong evi-
dence that currently both insurgents and 
government officials in Ghazni Province 
benefit financially from smuggling chromite 
collected from old Soviet mines in southern 
Ghazni City, Muqur, Gelan, Zanakhan, Deh 
Yak, and Andar districts (ICG 2011). Examples 
of lootable natural resources in Afghanistan 
include harvesting, such as narcotics, gem-
stones, and lumber; or occupying, a category 
which includes land that may come with 
such secondary benefits as oil and gold, or 
access to urban marketplaces where rents or 
other allowances are gained. 
Unlootable natural resources are those 
resources that require infrastructure and 
investment to exploit, such as copper, gold, 
and petroleum. Conflict surrounding these 
unlootable resources is usually a result of 
environmental pollution and socio-cultural 
disruption, such as the influx of foreign work-
ers or the displacement of the population. 
The profits from the exploitation of unloota-
ble resources generally accrue to the gov-
ernment and foreign companies that bring 
the capital and technology to develop them 
(Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005). Where cor-
rupt and unaccountable governments fail to 
share the profits and provide public services 
with local communities, violence against the 
government or targeted communities that 
appear to be the main recipients of wealth is 
often a primary recourse of the community.
Unlootable resources found in Ghazni Prov-
ince include copper and gold in the Muqur 
and Andar Districts, and lithium in the Nawur 
and Nawa Districts. The Ministry of Mines 
and Petroleum has tender packages for the 
Zarkashan Copper and Gold Area of Interest 
(AOI) in Muqur (which was recently awarded 
to Sterling Mining Company), the Katawas 
Gold Area of Interest in Andar District, and 
the Dashte-e Nawur in Nawur District (MoM 
2012). Given the current limited institutional 
and technological infrastructure for Afghani-
stan to begin work on its unlootable assets, 
non-state and autonomous organizations 
have relied upon the ‘lootable’ portion of 
valuable minerals in Ghazni and throughout 
Afghanistan. The following section continues 
the focus on the obstacles associated with 
lootable resource and security architectures 
in Ghazni Province.
War is Hell, but Business is Booming
In order for insurgent or criminal groups to 
meet the demands of recruitment, control, 
and credibility they need resources. Due 
to structural barriers such as regulations 
and international regimes preventing state 
resource endowments from reaching illicit 
organizations, groups must evolve to identify 
and exploit alternative funding streams. In 
the post-Cold War era, state-funding towards 
terrorist and insurgent organizations has 
declined or, in many cases, shifted to new 
states, resulting in a ‘new’ conflict economy 
that seeks to gain from natural resource 
wealth and illicit businesses (Giraldo & 
Trinkunas 2007). For example, in Colombia, 
paramilitaries and leftist insurgent groups 
continue to benefit from narcotics traffick-
ing (Felbab Brown 2010; Sanin 2008). And 
there are a variety of examples of Iran, North 
Korea, Pakistan and other states supporting 
insurgent or terrorist factions (Levitt 2007; 
Gamba & Cornwell 2000). In many instances, 
the role of evolving resource architectures 
also forces the participating organization 
to adapt its own tactics, strategy, and funda-
mental ideology. For example, the evolving 
nature of opium production, distribution, 
and sales has led to varying forms of ‘Taliban’ 
organizations in Afghanistan that are moti-
vated less by ideology and more by profit 
(Peters 2009; Dupee 2010).
The Haqqani Network is a case study in 
organizational adaptation to this new eco-
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nomic paradigm. After international funding 
flows to the mujahedeen declined precipi-
tously with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Jalaluddin Haqqani supplemented funds 
from Persian Gulf donors with kidnapping 
and smuggling operations (Dressler 2012). 
The organization also exploited chromite 
smuggling from eastern Afghanistan, which 
has been especially profitable, as well as 
transporting illegally harvested timber to 
markets in Pakistan (NYT 2011). Chromite is 
mined from Logar, Ghazni, and Khost with 
the assistance of local tribes and businesses 
and smuggled across the border into Paki-
stan. Chromite (or chromium oxide) is a rare 
earth element that brings a price between 
US$280–700 per metric ton on the global 
market (there are nearly 1 million tons of 
chromite in Logar and Khost alone) (ToI 
2012). Criminal syndicates may also out-
source chromite smuggling operations to the 
Haqqanis or allied insurgent groups in Paki-
stan such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
and other cross-border affiliates. In 2009, 
smugglers in Ghazni paid between US$400 
and US$2,000 per truck in protection money 
to government security forces (Dupee 2012). 
Given the heavy weight of chromite, it is 
often hidden within timber convoys.
The network has also expanded into licit 
markets that are well established in Ghazni 
City. Fabric and clothing traders from Paktia 
province operate large shops that are impor-
tant facilitators for moving network funds 
and providing cover for network members 
transiting through Ghazni province north 
towards Kabul or south towards Kandahar. 
In addition, there are many other busi-
nesses that support the network in south-
eastern Afghanistan, particularly in Ghazni 
City. A well known supporter of the network 
maintains several electronics and auto parts 
shops in the transit center of Ghazni that 
provide support for the vast transport indus-
try owned by the family. In addition to ties 
to these licit businesses that support opera-
tions, the network transfers and launders 
large amounts of money from Dubai, Saudi 
Arabia, and other Arab countries in Ghazni 
City through well established hawaladars 
(Peters 2012).3 
One can assume that the deep roots the 
Haqqanis and their broad network holds in 
Ghazni province is well known to the Afghan 
government and Taliban shadow government 
given the volume and extent of resource flows 
through the provincial capital. Recent reports 
suggest the US Congress will soon compel 
the White House to implement a compre-
hensive strategy against the network, notably 
targeting its financing capabilities (Foreign 
Policy 2013). In addition, previous Ghazni 
government officials have been implicated 
in chromite smuggling and it is well known 
among Ghazni residents that current GIRoA 
officials continue to participate in illicit min-
ing and smuggling of chromite (NYT 2008; 
2009; Kendall 2011). Outside of Ghazni, the 
nexus of illicit mining and state sponsorship 
is prevalent and well documented. Amongst 
local Afghans we interviewed, the question of 
illegal mining was usually approached with 
a chuckle; acknowledging the plight with a 
hint of sarcasm.
The tales of corruption we heard in 2012 
were nothing new. A 2009 New York Times 
report provided a list of corrupt practices by 
GIRoA officials and security forces in Ghazni 
that disturbed US soldiers: 
Police officials who steal truckloads of 
gasoline; judges and prosecutors who 
make decisions based on bribes; high-
ranking government officials who 
reap payoffs from hashish and chro-
mite smuggling; and mid-level secu-
rity and political jobs that are sold, 
sometimes for more than 50,000 dol-
lars, money the buyers then recoup 
through still more bribes and theft.
In addition, an incredible analysis of the Tajik 
mafia and insurgent connections with recon-
struction contracts in Ghazni came from 
a 2009 Center for Army Lessons Learned 
report (Kendall 2011). The author noted that 
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Ghazni Tajiks, which maintained a virtual 
monopoly on development projects in the 
province, realized a need for maintaining 
‘a certain level of instability’ to pay off the 
monthly US$150,000 insurgent tax as well 
convince U.S. and coalition sponsors of the 
need for even more projects. While deployed 
to Ghazni, we continued to hear complaints 
from Afghans regarding the continued cor-
ruption of certain members within the Tajik 
community and the Afghan government. 
Many viewed the conflict in Ghazni with an 
existential glaze—as a system where the few 
could accumulate vast quantities of wealth 
and power with no repercussions. 
The unintended consequences of US and 
international relationships with corrupt 
political figures is the loss of military and 
diplomatic credibility and the prevailing 
view among Afghans that the US and its 
partners, at best, support criminality, and 
at worst, the insurgency itself. The focus on 
‘transition’ from US to Afghan sovereignty 
likely increased the reliance on officials irre-
spective of their notorious backgrounds or 
patronage networks and our own process of 
willful ignorance shielded us from the nega-
tive consequences to follow, namely a broken 
system based more on corrupt networks than 
the benevolent institutions we sold in brief-
ings and press reports (NYT 2013). Integrity 
Watch Afghanistan presented a scathing 
report in April 2013 that accused a Khas 
Kunar Afghan Local Police Commander of 
running an ‘illicit’ chromite extraction ring 
with support from the Task Force for Busi-
ness Stability Operations (TFBSO). The lat-
ter’s explanation of the strategy (noted in 
the Integrity Watch report) seemed to match 
much of US stability practices over the last 
ten years: identify and support practical 
grassroots business opportunities that work 
at the local level, even though they may 
not necessarily fit the institutional archi-
tecture established within the new minis-
tries in Kabul. TFBSO acknowledged in the 
report that they were actively looking at 
implementing a similar program in Ghazni 
Province; however, the Ministry of Interior 
released a statement soon after release of 
the report that illegal chromite extraction in 
Khas Kunar was halted (Khaama 2013). The 
efforts of TFBSO to support the ALP com-
mander and his village, while sincere, ran 
into the bottleneck of Kabul bureaucracy 
that on one hand facilitates corrupt patron-
age networks, while, on the other, prosecut-
ing with diligence. 
Understanding how criminal organizations 
operate within the regional political econ-
omy is essential to reducing the leverage 
these networks, associated criminal syndi-
cates, and corrupt government officials have 
on the community. Adopting policies that 
respond to the realities that allow an insur-
gency to survive is fundamental to mitigating 
the malicious effects on the population and 
providing incentives for peace, rather than 
continuing conflict. Moreover, it makes our 
effects as stability practitioners more stable 
and long lasting. Stability practitioners have 
a tough job when the conflict itself serves 
as the means and mechanism for access and 
exploitation of profit. The following section 
looks at how land compounds this problem 
and serves as a lootable resource in conflict.
Land as a Lootable Resource in Ghazni
In intra-state conflicts, land is often given as 
a prize or gift to loyal soldiers, sympathizers, 
and patrons in exchange for their support 
(Unruh & Corriveau-Bourque 2011). Conflict 
presents opportunity for land seizures to 
occur as people are displaced from territory, 
opponents are marginalized, and strategic 
regions are occupied by violent actors. For 
example, in Sri Lanka, East Timor, Sudan and 
Syria, insurgent and counterinsurgent forces 
attempting to control strategic territory dis-
placed residents of various ethnic or sectar-
ian identities. 
In Ghazni, land mafia operating with their 
own militia forces evicted residents from 
over 150,000 acres of government owned 
property (out of 800,000 acres or nearly 20 
per cent of government-owned land), forg-
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ing official documents, and bribing public 
officials to legitimize the seizure of pub-
lic land (Ghaznavi 2012). Oftentimes, the 
very land seized is used as a bribe to pay off 
groups or individuals. We anticipate those in 
the land mafia are creating a patronage net-
work inside and outside the government in 
preparation for coalition departure that can 
benefit key individuals and groups. We often 
heard from our Afghan colleagues that when 
certain governing decisions or processes 
need rejection or validation, elites within 
the land mafia could sway decisions in their 
favor by promising, gifting, or appropriating 
land. Accusations were ripe from governing 
authorities to private citizens that powerful 
figures within the Ministry of Interior or posi-
tions of authority such as district governors 
were recipients of seized land. Afghan land 
authorities and citizens have complained 
publicly that government-owned land was 
seized in nearly every district in Ghazni. As 
accusations were so prevalent, it seemed a 
futile effort to try to decipher the identity 
or truth behind the land mafia. The land 
selected was typically valuable in that it held 
a canal system or agricultural potential, sat 
on a historical site, or was located near strate-
gic lines of communication such as Highway 
One. US personnel attempting to track and 
manage the situation found it an impossible 
task and one best left to the future governing 
bodies of Afghanistan.
The power of the land mafia in Ghazni is 
strong and new Afghan institutions may find 
it a staggering task to cope with. A previous 
judicial director, Abdul-Razaq Azizi, noted in 
the press that he cannot identify or discuss 
members of the land mafia without putting 
his life at risk; however ‘most land grabbers 
have important positions within the Ghazni 
local government’ (Ghaznavi 2012). In our 
interviews, a number of Afghans warned that 
they could not go public with information 
regarding land grabs, also fearing for their 
lives.. In one case, twelve land mafia figures 
were arrested according to Ghazni’s director 
of agriculture, but later released. Attempts to 
re-seize government land have thus far been 
inadequate, with only ten per cent brought 
back under government control. Most of the 
seized land was allocated to serve as town-
ships to house schoolteachers, police officers 
and administrators; however, to date, no land 
has been distributed outside the land mafia.
The problem is not limited to Ghazni: 
throughout Afghanistan, land seizures have 
been taking place for years (BBC 2007; Ariana 
2011; Wakht 2012). The High Office of Over-
sight and Anti-corruption (HOOAC) stated 
that land mafia seized 16,308 acres in the 
first six months of 2012. In 2007, the Afghan 
Urban Development Minister stated that 
land was appropriated at a rate of two square 
kilometers per day (BBC 2007). The seizure 
of land often sparks clashes, as occurred 
between Kuchi nomads and Hazaras in Kabul 
and Wardak Province, (Wily 2008). The case 
study of the Aynak Copper Project is one 
where ‘major legal and regulatory issues’ 
were ignored regarding the exercise of emi-
nent domain and the forced resettlement of 
people (Stanley & Mikhaylova 2011). 
Another consideration is that land itself 
may only be a symptom of the real problem—
weak rule of law that cannot effectively medi-
ate conflict resolution (Ross 2004). Land is 
merely the object, but the process of seizure 
and the failure of government action is the 
key issue. Given weak institutions, historical 
animosities, and the ambiguous structure 
of land holdings in Afghanistan, it is often 
difficult to determine who owns what in a 
particular area. During our field research, we 
were often told that strongmen exploit and 
manipulate land registries to acquire land. 
With a weak legal system, an evicted resident 
(notably termed a ‘squatter’ in the Afghan 
press) has virtually no recourse. In addition, 
land tenure proceedings may be conducted 
in a number of different systems: statutory, 
customary, or Shariat (Wily 2003). These 
institutions are separate from each other, 
and allow for individuals to try each system 
until a positive outcome is achieved. Since 
the systems do not work together, one court 
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may hand down a positive decision while 
another hands down a negative one. Often-
times, each individual disputing land seizure 
has written documentation legitimizing his 
claim, making it difficult to determine valid-
ity. Government officials sometimes give 
land to patrons and document the transac-
tion as legitimate, adding a further layer of 
bureaucracy to the problem.4 In some cases, 
government officials abuse their position 
and exploit the inefficiencies of govern-
ment to plan, document, and legitimize the 
seizure of public property for personal gain. 
Like mining laws, many within the govern-
ment lack the incentive to fix the system as 
they continue to benefit from weak and inef-
ficient bureaucracy.
Conclusion
While we do not argue Ghazni is currently 
facing a resource conflict, we recognize con-
ditions that may bring about one. With 2014 
here, and the drawdown of foreign security 
forces looming large in the minds of Afghans, 
it is still not clear how the country will fare 
in political, security, and development are-
nas. Some predict the country will fall into 
civil war, and at a minimum, voice concerns 
similar to Felbab-Brown that, ‘fundamental 
questions about the efficacy of stabiliza-
tion efforts in Afghanistan continue to lack 
clear answers’ (2012). The 2013 US National 
Intelligence Estimate reportedly declares 
that with a US drawdown in troops and aid, 
the ‘situation [will] deteriorate very rapidly’ 
and Kabul institutions will lose influence as 
warlords enrich and empower themselves 
(Washington Post 2013). As the international 
community minimizes its presence and role 
in Afghanistan, it appears all the ingredients 
are in place for a dire situation in Ghazni 
Province, particularly as local resource archi-
tecture continues to develop to exploit the 
supply chains of resources such as copper, 
gold and lithium. 
International military and diplomatic offi-
cials work closely with many of the elite indi-
viduals that play a direct or indirect role in 
land mafias and illicit mineral extraction. It 
may not be possible to prevent a new era of 
robber barons from rising up amidst the con-
flict and opportunity environment, however 
external actors may be able to mentor, moni-
tor, and mitigate individuals, organizations, 
and resource conflicts before they reach a 
tipping point. We offer six recommendations 
for mitigating the onset of resource conflict 
in Ghazni.
1. Assist the Afghan Land Authority 
(Arazi), in developing and standard-
izing linkages between statutory 
and customary law systems so both 
sides are aware of rule of law judg-
ments and guidelines on the village, 
district, and provincial levels. 
2. Empower the state’s formal legal 
system by incorporating anonymous 
prosecutors and judges (with exter-
nal oversight) that can prosecute 
illicit mining and land mafia opera-
tions without fear of retaliation.
3. Encourage and support journalistic 
accounts focused on land grabbers, 
the narratives of evicted residents, 
and the role of government and 
nongovernment institutions in pre-
venting illicit land seizures.
4. Enhance the relationship between 
TFBSO and the MoMP to further 
assist with developing a legal sys-
tem for artisanal, small-scale min-
ing so that the Afghan government 
can track and tax activity that is a 
daily livelihood for many Afghans, 
minimizing the role of illicit mining 
and removing a valuable revenue 
stream from insurgents.
5. Assist the MoMP with the develop-
ment of Afghan-run interagency 
development teams co-located with 
village stability operations in areas 
where the lootable resource archi-
tecture is a part of the economic 
supply chain. These teams should 
try to incorporate or co-opt current 
community labor structures, while 
developing licit value chains that 
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benefit the community and provide 
a sound tax base for the Afghan gov-
ernment.
6. Monitor and apply strict disciplinary 
standards to Afghan Local Police 
and other military and paramili-
tary security institutions to prevent 
predatory behavior within lootable 
resource areas. 
Overall, these efforts can serve as a start-
ing point for international organizations to 
mentor the Afghan government and Afghan 
businesses in the creation of value chains 
that provide incentives encouraging peace 
rather than continuing violence. There are 
no easy fixes to complex problems such as 
the emergence of resource conflicts, which 
can be precipitated by any number of vari-
ables both internal and external to a society. 
However, early recognition may allow stabil-
ity practitioners to appropriately focus their 
operations before problems worsen.
Notes
 1 The opinions and analysis presented 
in this paper are the authors’ only and 
unless otherwise stated, do not reflect 
the views of the U.S., NATO, Afghanistan, 
or associated institutions.
 2 In comparison to the estimated 300 legal 
mines under MoMP control. Numbers 
provided to authors from a governance 
advisor to the World Bank in Afghanistan.
 3 Hawaladar is a network of Hawala or an 
informal money transfer system. 
 4 For example, in Nangarhar, Governor Gul 
Agha Sherzai may have given a colleague, 
Shir Mohammad 45 acres after Moham-
mad’s land in Kabul was confiscated by 
the government (Taneen 2012).
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